Cal Biz Lit

Wal-Mart Class Certification Affirmed By Ninth Circuit En Banc

This just in:  class certification in Dukes v. Wal-mart, the wage discrimination class action filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, has been affirmed in part by the Ninth Circuit.  The slip opinion is here.  137 pages.  Knock your self out.

Bottom line:  class certification affirmed as to injunctive relief, and as to women employed by Wal-Mart when the case was filed.  Remanded for further consideration on punitive damages and on certification, or separate class status, for women who were ex-employees when case filed.

More later.

Yet Another Component Parts Decision -- For The Defense Again

Last year, Cal Biz Lit started tracking a series of cases on the "component parts doctrine."  The doctrine essentially says this:  A component manufacturer is subject to product liability only when the component itself has a defect that results in injury, or the manufacture plays a material role in integrating the component into a finished product whose defect causes injury. 

The context has appeared in a series of cases where (a) a manufacturer sold steel valves and pumps to the United States Navy, which incorporated them into ships' engine and boiler rooms;  (b) after the sale, the valves and pumps were equipped with asbestos gaskets and packing (or old gaskets and packing were removed and replaced) and there is no evidence that the replaced or replacement materials came from the valve or pump manufacturer; (c) the plaintiff, who worked in boiler or engine room, contracts an asbestos-related disease thirty years or more later, and sues the manufacturer.  You can see previous posts on this subject here, here and here.

So far, in one citeable case, Taylor v. Elliott Turbomachinery Co., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 564, a court of appeal has held that the component parts doctrine means the plaintiff can't recover against the manufacturer.  Plus, the plaintiff can't show a nexus between the manufacturer and the asbestos.  In O'Neil v. Crane Co. (2009) , a different court of appeal reached the opposite conclusion.  The Cal Supremes granted a petition for hearing so O'Neil is not citeable.  In Merrill v. Leslie Controls, Inc. (2009), a different panel of the same court of appeal agreed with Taylor.  The Supremes granted what we in California call a "grant and hold" on this one, meaning it isn't citeable either, and the Supremes won't do anything on it until they decide O'Neil.

And now, another one, also from the Second District Court of Appeal, agreeing with Taylor -- no liability for the supplier of component parts.  Walton v. The William Powell Company (2010) ___Cal.App.4th___ (April 22, 2010, B208214).  But we can expect a petition for hearing and a grant and hold on that one as well.  Until the Supremes decide the question, the authority in California will be Taylor.

Cal Supremes Deny Hearing On Private Bounty Hunter Declaratory Relief Decision

In December, as CBL covered here, California's Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that a company that receives a sixty day notice under Proposition 65 can bring a declaratory relief action against the private party enforcer / bounty hunter (in this case, Dr. Whitney Leeman) seeking a declaration that it isn't violating the statute before the bounty hunter files an enforcement action.  American Meat Institute v. Leeman (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 728.  The Cal Supremes have now denied a hearing.  This means the decision of the Court of Appeal is final and binding on all trial courts in California.

The case presents a pretty interesting tactical angle.  The vast majority of bounty hunter cases seem to be filed in San Francisco, Alameda or Los Angeles counties.  The San Francisco and Alameda County benches have taken a rather favorable view of Proposition 65 actions, as has Court of Appeal District 1, where cases from these counties go on appeal.

But a Declaratory Relief action can be venued wherever the defendant resides, and many of the private party enforcer/bounty hunters reside in fairly remote locations.  So if a company plans to contest a Proposition 65 case, and wants a venue more favorable than the typical urban courts, why shouldn't it consider a declaratory judgment action against the bounty hunter where the latter lives?