Most plaintiff personal injury attorneys' have provisions in their fee agreements giving them a lien against client recovery. In a wide variety of circumstances, the medical providers may have a lien against the recovery as well.
So what happens when the case tanks and there isn't enough money to pay off both the liens? In a California case of first impression, California's Court of Appeal for the Third District holds that as a matter of public policy, the attorneys' lien for fees and costs comes first. The case is Gilman v. Dalby (August 10, 2009) ___Cal.App.4th___ (C050294).
But don't worry, there wasn't some poor doctor left out in the cold. The medical lien was owned by Lien Medical, a personal injury medical lien factor ("Turn your liens into greens" -- the colors appear at this company's web site). And Lien Medical, which has already satisfied the provider, is the one to get stuck. But the decision is much broader than that, and pretty clearly applies to all medical liens.
BTB, this is the sort of garden variety call that appellate courts have to make every day. There's no applicable statute of any kind, and it's really a matter of advancing the common law. And it demonstrates that when people -- usually politicians with agendas -- talk about judges "interpreting the law" vs. "making the law," they either don't know what they are talking about or they are deliberately avoiding an honest discussion of how the law works.
I have a different view of Gilman. There is a statute referenced in the case that governs, section 2897 enacted in 1872 as part of California's first Civil Code. The statute requires that liens created first in time prevail unless other things are not equal. Gilman was decided on public policy grounds without any evidence, fact finding or basis. It assumed that attorney liens as a class were superior over those of medical providers, whether or not the medical lien was prior. The Gilman court simply pointed out some differences between the lienors, which can be done in any case, and deemed them sufficiently unequal to justify its rule. It did so in contravention of existing law. See Waltrip, 164 Cal.App.4th 517, 526 (an attorney lien "does not have priority over prior liens on the same property"). Additionally, lien priority, is a function of legislative intent, not judicial fiat. See Guinn v. McReynolds (1918) 177 Cal. 230, 232, 237; Takehara v. H.C. Muddox Co. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 168, 172; Roseburg Loggers (1975) 14 Cal.3d 742, 750. Courts are not to engage in policy making without legislative enactment in support. Indeed, the policy must be tethered to some legislatively declared public policy or proof of some actual or threatened impact. Cel-Tech, (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 187; Green (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80. The Gilman court did not point to a single study or any proof to support its activist new rule. Nor did it point to any legislatively declared public policy. If its theory of financial harm to the injured absent its rule were correct, it should not have been difficult for the court to point to a study or some evidence thereof in the 137 years since section 2897 was enacted. It was up to the legislature to make such a sweeping change in lien priority. Two decades of legislative inaction, however, is persuasive. Cel-Tech (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 178. Finally, the Gilman court acknowledged the threat that medical lienors may not treat the injured if a later attorney's lien is to be superior. In its rule, the Gilman court turned public policy on its head and subordinated the health if not the lives of patients in favor of the financial interests of members of the bar.
Posted by: Craig McLaughlin, Esq. | August 19, 2009 at 11:03 AM